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Abstract
I examine whether firms with the ability to manipulate earnings per share (EPS) rounding
and the incentive to defer the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404(b) (SOX 404(b))
compliance round down EPS to understate earnings before a public float evaluation in the second
fiscal quarter. I build on existing literature that acknowledges some firms may manipulate the postdecimal (thousandths) digit of EPS and that firms near the SOX 404(b) public float compliance
threshold may initiate avoidance techniques to defer the marginal cost of an Internal Controls over
Financial Reporting (ICFR) external audit. By comparing the rounding behavior of accelerated
filers and non-accelerated filers with public floats between ±20% of $75 million, I provide
evidence that profitable non-accelerated filers faced with the marginal SOX 404(b) compliance
costs have a higher likelihood of rounding down their diluted EPS to the nearest cent in the first
fiscal quarter compared to accelerated filers in the same quarter. These results are consistent with
non-accelerated filers managing reported EPS to avoid costly compliance with SOX 404(b).

Introduction
There is a large literature on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in accounting,
economics, finance, law, and political science. I draw on this literature to explore how SOX
changed business practices in the 21st century. SOX compliance is a challenging undertaking for
new accelerated filers, and I hypothesize that earnings management observed by larger firms under
the pressure to meet analyst expectations could be adapted by a class of companies with different
motivations. Firms near the public float threshold for SOX 404 compliance are under a different
type of scrutiny that can cost millions of dollars in increased compliance costs if their public float
increases by the end of the second fiscal quarter. If positive stock performance is tied to this
outcome, then management is in a position where slight, yet recoverable periods of
unattractiveness in the stock market may be advantageous. My hypothesis is that if firms have the
incentive to either intentionally round down, or avoid rounding up, their EPS in the quarter
preceding their public float evaluation, then non-accelerated filers may be more likely to round
down EPS specifically in the first fiscal quarter than accelerated filers. My initial descriptive
statistics are promising, and a difference-in-difference regression analysis reveals that nonaccelerated filers in the first fiscal quarter may be more likely to round down their diluted EPS
than accelerated filers. This observation is consistent exclusively in the first fiscal quarter.
For the purposes of this paper, SOX 404 will always imply the audit component of SOX
404, unless stated otherwise. Part 1 will examine the business and political climate preceding the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its general effects. Part 2 will provide a more detailed review of
SOX 404 (one of the costliest sections of SOX), discuss its effects in the market, and review
literature supporting the occurrence of SOX 404 avoidance techniques. Part 3 will explore the
existing literature on earnings management, providing evidence of firms intentionally

manipulating both earnings and EPS. Part 4 will outline the sampling method, descriptive statistics,
and methods used to test the hypothesis. Finally, part 5 will conclude by interpreting the results in
Part 4 and identifying areas for additional research.

Part 1: SOX Legislative History
Passed in the wake of several high-profile corporate scandals, SOX became one of the most
influential statutes for business governance. Despite its 21st century enactment, its roots can be
traced to corporate oversight debates in the 1990’s, culminating with the tumultuous scandals of
the early 2000’s.
In the 1990’s, corporate governance practices were changing. One notable point of
contention was the proliferation of equity-based compensation, sparking debates over whether the
market or regulation should be used to incentivize or enforce honesty. Some argued that stock
options were an efficient way to encourage honesty from executives, with all shareholders
benefiting from actions taken to raise stock prices. However, others were skeptical that this would
lead to earnings manipulation and falsely inflated trading prices (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003).
Ultimately, executives’ short-sighted behavior to obscure their losses and bolster stock value
resulted in several high-profile scandals, redefining modern business practices and amplifying
public divisions about corporate responsibility.
These concerns over incentivized and enforced honesty were validated after Enron was
discovered using special purpose entities (SPIs) to conceal their unsustainable debt. Enron’s failure
was viewed as a market failure since investors were still trading shares for $30-$40 immediately
before its downfall. Policy makers also viewed this as a failure of the public accounting profession.
Arthur Andersen, Enron’s auditor at the time, did not insist on Enron disclosing their use of SPIs,

and the audit firm also presided over several high-profile scandals of the early 2000’s. As a result,
there was growing sentiment that corporations could not be responsible with their shareholders’
money (Ribstein 2002). With the attitude towards ‘big business’ becoming more critical (Romano
2005), corporate reform was considered a viable option.
The haste in which SOX was passed into law has been a topic of debate for almost 20 years.
While some saw SOX as a method of restoring investor confidence during a stock market decline
(Romano 2005), others used it to appear tough on corruption for the upcoming midterm elections,
while a few even considered it an opportunity to revisit previously lost causes. For example, former
SEC chair Arthur Levitt spearheaded the segregation of audit and non-audit services for audit
clients in 2000 and became a trusted Democratic advisor later in 2002. With the political
atmosphere shifting in his favor, the Senate succeeded in adding Section 201 to the bill,
accomplishing Levitt’s goal (Romano 2005). The act itself took less than a year to pass, leaving
little room for researching the economic effects of the activities that SOX aimed to curtail.
There was abundant evidence at the disposal of lawmakers if they were curious about the
economic consequences of their actions. Romano (2005) examined 25 studies from before 2002
that appraised the audit quality of companies accepting audit and non-audit services from the same
audit firm. 19 concluded that it was a nonproblem, with 15 determining no significant correlation
between non-audit engagements and audit quality (Romano 2005). Thus, analysts were concerned
that future audits with increased independence could lead to reduced access to information,
potentially leading to poorer audit quality and a counterproductive effect of the Act (Ribstein
2002). Despite the available expertise on the subject, only 8 academics and policy analysts
combined out of 65 total witnesses were given the floor when SOX was up for debate (Romano

2005). Congress’ failure to put such a far-reaching section under any objective level of scrutiny
represents a fraction of this law’s cost since its enactment.
From its inception, SOX greatly influenced corporate governance practices. The main
objectives of this law were to establish further auditor independence, mandate additional
disclosures, and make audit firms and executives more responsible for their actions. This was
implemented by establishing the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to
monitor the performance of audit firms. In order to ensure the independence of the PCAOB, its
governance board membership was limited to only two former CPA’s (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002). In addition, SOX restricted non-audit services for audit clients and mandated the rotation
of an audit partner after 5 years. Further limitations were applied on audit clients where senior
managers may have had former experience with their audit firms (Ribstein 2002).
In direct response to upper management’s actions after the Enron and WorldCom scandals,
Section 404(a) required management’s personal appraisal of Internal Controls over Financial
Reporting (ICFR) (Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al 2008). In addition to management’s testing, Section
404(b), arguably the most costly section of SOX, stated that “each registered public accounting
firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall attest to, and report on, the
assessment made by the management of the issuer…. Any such attestation shall not be the subject
of a separate engagement” (italics and parentheses added) (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). To
augment the actions taken to improve accountability and scope, Section 906(c) imposed a penalty
of up to $5 million or 20 years in prison to anyone who knowingly falsified anything mandated in
the Act (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). This law succeeded in both satisfying representatives
concerned about their reputation and stakeholders who felt that legislation was necessary to
promote a more trustworthy market for investors.

The bill’s opponents based most of their arguments on the ideology that the market can
identify firms that are irresponsible with shareholder wealth (Ribstein 2002). Many of SOX’s
target behaviors already had preexisting market consequences, suggesting that shareholders
already had the power to demand the extent of corporate disclosures. For example, before 2002,
stock prices fell for companies that had significant off-balance sheet transactions (Romano 2005).
This may be because some corporate governance practices, though permissible, were suggestive
enough about fiscal health; thus, corporations with fewer incentives to conceal information would
disengage from unhealthy behaviors. The variety of state corporate laws also provided an
opportunity for market-based alternatives to regulations. Since each state has different corporate
governance laws, firms can deliberately decide where to incorporate. One prominent example is
the prevalence of firms incorporating in Delaware. While the so-called “Delaware loophole” has
been cited as an inherent flaw in this system, proponents would argue that this is simply a sign of
“smart shopping”. In fact, both Enron and WorldCom, notorious for their corporate scandals, were
both incorporated outside of Delaware where anti-takeover provisions were more stringent
(Ribstein 2002). It was argued that firms unconcerned about takeovers would incorporate
themselves in another state, both to pursue other opportunities and avoid sending a pessimistic
message about their stock outlook.
Those in favor of market-based regulatory solutions argue that if shareholders valued
information enough to justify its costs, then disclosing it would have been a natural expectation in
the open market. The rational is that by giving firms the choice between disclosure and nondisclosure, their decision would not only suggest the firm’s willingness to be transparent, but also
take their owners’ expectations into consideration. Since none of SOX’s mandates were previously

required by any of the 50 states or the District of Columbia, it could be inferred that investors were
indifferent about this information and did not find it material in their appraisals (Romano 2005).
As a result, some researchers argued that government interference with disclosure
requirements would only create an inconsequential ability to detect fraud. Increasing the scope of
an audit that is only meant to provide reasonable assurance, unlike a forensic audit, commands a
great cost from stakeholders while potentially doing little to uncover additional risk factors. In
addition, with increased disclosure requirements, investors may not know how to use this
information because they never demanded it in the first place. An adverse effect might also occur
after increasing disclosure mandates; investors might seek false comfort that the government can
put companies under greater scrutiny than market-based solutions (Ribstein 2002). Despite
investor reactions to SOX disclosure requirements ranging from pessimism to indifference, the
returns on the increased regulations are only questionable.
Even at great cost to firms, the effects of several sections of SOX may be ineffectual. For
example, complete audit firm independence, while decreasing the chance of collusion with clients,
can be a less effective method of gathering information. Without any insider knowledge
whatsoever, the cost of obtaining information may increase, the audit team may not be able to
identify high-risk components, and an adversarial relationship between the audit firm and the client
may arise (Ribstein 2002). In addition, smaller and foreign firms trading in the US have fewer
resources to commit to corporate governance practices that were intended for larger firms (Ribstein
2005 and Romano 2005). These implications will be further explored in the next section.
Some benefits did arise from the Act. While it is true that some financial analysts did
predict Enron’s collapse despite their off-balance sheet SPI’s, in a free market scenario, they would
have been motivated to protect their own self-interest. When analysts foresaw a failure of a firm

and wanted to warn outsiders, they would need to provide their rationale and risk exposing their
modeling techniques, a competitive advantage in their industry (Ribstein 2002). Since SOX
enforces greater disclosure for the sake of all stakeholders, more stakeholders have a chance to
draw their own conclusions, provided they know how to interpret this new information.
However, increased regulation imposes an additional inefficiency. One of the broader
consequences of SOX 404 is the increased price of audits due to a smaller pool of available audit
firms registered with the PCAOB. In addition, Section 201 drastically reduced the advisory arms
of audit firms, potentially exaggerating the oligopoly of the Big 3 consulting firms by greatly
reducing the scope of the audit firms’ consulting services (Ribstein 2002).
In response to a pessimistic business environment, SOX was presented to investors as a
quick fix to a faltering economy and as a rallying cry for policymakers. SOX compliance has been
a significant point of consideration for audit firms and industry alike, despite the lack of research
conducted beforehand on its potential consequences. Now that the scope of SOX has been
established, it is appropriate to examine its impacts on emerging businesses to understand their
desire to avoid mandated compliance.

Part 2: A Detailed Review of SOX 404(b)
Mandated internal control requirements brought on by SOX 404(b) were not without
precedent, but SOX was responsible for making it a basic expectation instead of an exception for
specific industries. Before SOX, audit firms still required an understanding of ICFR in order to
properly plan their audit (Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al 2008), but after the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, financial institutions became subject to internal control
assessments. Between 1991 and 2002, non-financial institutions were only required to report ICFR

issues in their 8-K’s during an auditor change (McVay 2011). This practice became more popular
for regulators when in 1993, guidelines for voluntary ICFR disclosures were released. Despite this,
only about 30% of companies volunteered to provide an extended report of their ICFR, and stock
prices did not seem to be impacted by the corporations’ choice to disclose (Kinney and Shepardson
2011).
SOX cleared the House of Representatives before Section 404 was added by the Senate.
At the time, Congressman Christopher Cox stated that “the objective of Section 404 is to provide
meaningful disclosure to investors without creating unnecessary compliance burdens or wasting
shareholder resources” (Kinney and Shepardson 2011). In May and June 2003, the SEC first
announced their intention to defer SOX 404 compliance (Weber and Yang 2018). Compliance was
rolled out based on a firm’s filing status, which is determined by the aggregate market value of
shares held by firm outsiders (public float) at the end of the second fiscal quarter. Nonaccelerated
filers are firms that have always had a public float of less than $75 million on their yearly
measurement dates, or any former accelerated filers that have had their public float drop below
$50 million on their measurement dates. Once a firm has a public float of over $75 million, they
become accelerated filers. Accelerated filers, assumed to have more resources, were expected to
be compliant with SOX 404 about one year ahead of non-accelerated filers (Gao, Wu, Zimmerman
2009). However, after several subsequent deferrals, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 ultimately exempted non-accelerated filers from SOX 404(b)
compliance with the addition of SOX 404(c) (Kinney and Shepardson 2011).
Firms have usually taken two general approaches to SOX 404 compliance: they can devote
a few resources to compliance or invest more to make a return on it. One example of a return on
SOX 404 investment includes finding convergence with SOX and other regulations and creating

seamless processes to fulfill both requirements. This also allows the company to improve their risk
mitigation techniques. Regardless of a company’s approach to compliance, it became common
practice to increase the prevalence of automated controls. Automated controls pose a lower risk
and reduce the extent and cost of controls testing. Over time, compliance processes have become
more efficient since internal auditors improved at properly identifying high-risk controls to test
(Wagner and Dittmar 2006).
SOX 404 compliance cost significantly more in its first year of implementation than in
subsequent years. Companies lacked a clear control framework, so many opted to test each control
for every process. However, as time went on, more cohesive control structures yielded additional
benefits for firms. Since controls ultimately influence the quality of financial information, strong
control infrastructure can positively influence mergers and acquisitions, foreign expansion, and
long supply chains. SOX 404 has also incentivized firms to run a ‘leaner’ control environment,
reducing maintenance and internal auditing costs (Wagner and Dittmar 2006). Despite these
benefits, executive surveys have revealed that while 49% of executives believe their company is
benefitting internally, 70% believe the costs outweigh the benefits (Eldridge and Kealey 2005).
The repercussions of SOX 404 will be discussed further.
Internal control deficiencies (ICDs) result from negative findings during the SOX 404
attestation. ICDs occur “when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or
its employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect
misstatements on a timely basis”, as a result of intentional or unintentional causes (AshbaughSkaife et. al 2008). The most common weakness has been a lack of segregation of duties, especially
when smaller firms lack the resources for effective staffing (Whalen and Hotham 2018). ICD
likelihood decreases with firm size, but increases with complexity, company growth, and

organizational restructuring. As a result, higher-growth companies face issues with updating their
ICFR framework in a timely manner (Eldridge and Kealey 2005). Approximately 70% of firms
that reported ineffective internal controls reported effective internal controls in the following year
(McVay 2011). This may be because before the first year of compliance, new accelerated filers
never had an incentive to invest in a sound control structure, only to be prompted to invest more
after a critical attestation (McVay 2011). Ultimately, the reduction of ICDs can lead to improved
accrual quality, suggesting a reduction in errors or the curtailing of lax management policies
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et. al 2008).
The total cost of SOX 404 can be divided into internal and external costs. In general, the
total costs can be projected as a function of company size, growth, industry, and effectiveness of
internal controls, with the SOX unit cost (cost per dollar of fixed assets) varying inversely with
size. Internal costs, usually arising from management’s attestation of internal controls and the
preparation for the external audit, are harder to determine since many companies have not
disclosed it. Most executives reported that these costs included hiring in-house GAAP experts
(A.R.C. Morgan 2005), compiling documentation, implementing new processes, training staff,
preparing annual reports, and hiring external consultants. However, the opportunity cost associated
with staffing individuals on compliance rather than on value-added activities provides an
additional obstacle for approximating the total internal cost (McVay 2011). Despite the SEC
estimating SOX 404(a) compliance cost at $91,000 per company in 2003, executive surveys
reported that these costs were slightly less than $500,000 (Eldridge and Kealey 2005).
Furthermore, voluntary disclosures and additional surveys from the SEC estimated that internal
costs represented approximately 62% of the cost of total SOX 404 compliance (Kinney and
Shepardson 2011).

The external cost of SOX 404 is easier to estimate since audit fees are publicly disclosed
in SGA expenses and management’s discussion in the financial reports (A.R.C. Morgan 2005). In
2004, the first year of mandatory SOX 404 compliance, audit fees were significantly higher than
in 2003, taking other macroeconomic variables into consideration. The increase was primarily
attributable to the marginal cost of the external attestation of ICFR. This conclusion was validated
by a sub sample of 97 firms that disclosed the components of their audit fees, citing SOX 404
compliance as a major contributor. Audit fees were typically higher for firms with ICDs. The SOX
audit rate (dollar per thousand dollars of fixed assets) increased by approximately 38% for firms
with ICDs. Financial service firms had a lower marginal unit cost than firms in other industries,
partly because they were already subject to ICFR audits before SOX (Eldridge and Kealey 2005).
In addition, due to the collapse of Arthur Andersen, contracting with large audit firms capable of
performing a SOX audit was more imperative and expensive due to increased demand and
decreased supply. Ultimately, the nominal increase in audit fees due to SOX was approximately
$1.3 million at the time (Iliev 2010). It is worth noting that this increase would have only been
experienced by accelerated filers, since they had to be compliant with SOX 404, unlike nonaccelerated filers. This could potentially create an incentive for small firms to avoid equity growth
and defer the marginal compliance cost. The PCAOB’s enhanced guidance for ICFR audits in
Auditing Standard No. 5 may have reduced the marginal cost of a SOX 404 audit, but smaller
firms received a lesser benefit compared to larger firms (Krishnan, Krishnan, Song 2011).
Smaller firms, the focus of my study, have been reported to receive a reduced marginal
benefit from compliance compared to larger firms. SOX 404 compliance has been described as a
somewhat fixed cost, due to the higher unit cost for small firms than for larger firms. This was
partly due to economies of scale for larger firms, but also because smaller firms now need to

compete with larger firms for costlier audit firms, since the same audit firm must be responsible
for the ICFR opinion and the non-SOX audit work (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). In the first year
of SOX 404 compliance, small accelerated filers have seen their audit fees double and their share
values fall. Some research has concluded that because of this, the market favors the deferral of
SOX 404 for non-accelerated filers (Gao, Wu, Zimmerman 2009). Previous estimates for initial
SOX 404 compliance were approximately $1 million per $1 billion in revenue, but smaller firms
with less than $2 billion in revenue experienced an average compliance cost of $1.8 million per $1
billion in revenue (A.R.C. Morgan 2005).
The lasting impacts of SOX 404 get more complicated. As with all regulations, compliance
will take away time and resources from other functions. However, the additional oversight for
ICFR can lead to greater accuracy in financial statements. Overall, compliance has been performed
more efficiently over time since audit firms now have a greater understanding of compliance for
their clients (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003). However, small companies may still face pressure to
stay small and avoid the audit fees due to the larger unit costs and fewer benefits from compliance.
They might be intentionally doing this since they have a greater likelihood of disclosing bad news
disclosures and lower earnings in the second quarter (Gao, Wu, Zimmerman 2009) and resorting
to debt financing as non-accelerated filers and reverting to equity financing as accelerated filers
(Weber and Yang 2018), all in an effort to either alter their share value or the amount of outstanding
shares before their public float evaluation. A more extreme option is to ‘go dark’ and reduce the
number of outside shareholders to fewer than 300 people. In 2003, studies showed that
approximately 200 firms went dark, and out of the 114 firms that did so in 2004, 44 cited SOX as
their primary motivator. However, this course of action is usually reserved for the companies with
the weakest growth potential (Ribstein 2005). Now that the motivations and methods of deferral

techniques for SOX 404 have been observed, I will take a closer look at earnings management and
apply it to SOX 404 compliance.

Part 3: An Overview of Earnings Management Techniques
Earnings management is any practice that is exercised to obscure a firm’s actual financial
performance (Malenko and Grundfest 2014). It can be difficult to distinguish intentional earnings
management from ineffective accounting practices, but there is some literature that has attempted
to distinguish between the two alternatives. Earnings management is usually observed by
appraising accrual quality, the degree to which total accruals or working capital accruals map to
past, present, and future cash flows. Firms with ICDs are more likely to make errors that add noise
to accruals and have larger absolute values of accruals. This is where the distinction between
unintentional and intentional actions is drawn: unintentional actions should lead to an equal
distribution of abnormal positive and negative accruals, while intentional actions should lead to
more abnormally positive accruals and fewer abnormally negative accruals (Ashbaugh-Skaife et.
al 2008). There is evidence that actual and discretionary accruals are also managed to control
public float (Iliev 2010). When managing earnings to manipulate public float, firms usually use
discretion with GAAP, make short term changes in the first quarter to influence their second
quarter evaluation, and are less likely to contract with a Big 4 audit firm (Nondorf, Singer, You
2012).
Earnings management has been observed in the rounding behavior of earnings. However,
the existing literature documenting earnings management for public float evaluations has only used
nominal measurements and has not documented the rounding behavior of earnings or EPS.
Nominal earnings have been observed to round favorably when firms are striving to meet analyst

expectations and sustain performance. Profitable firms were more likely to report a round number
($40 instead of $39, for example), since it has the psychological effect of appearing to be a
significantly greater number. Conversely, firms with losses were less likely to report a round
number (-$39 instead of -$40, for example) because the loss appears substantially less. High
growth firms are more likely to participate in rounding manipulation techniques (Das and Zhang
2003).
EPS has also been observed to round more favorably for firms with high analyst coverage.
The term “quadrophobia” was dubbed to identify the chronic pervasiveness of firms to
underrepresent the number 4 in the post-decimal digit of EPS. The frequency of post-decimal 4 for
target firms was only 7.9% with an expected frequency of 10%, and companies with a history of
quadrophobia were more likely to underrepresent a post-decimal 4 in the future. Additional
analysis has suggested that higher EPS leads to fewer incentives to round up since the rounding
effect produces less of a relative improvement. In addition, the closer EPS is to analysts’
expectations, the more likely it is to round up (Das and Zhang 2003). Firms with pervasive
quadrophobia were more likely to restate financial statements and be defendants in SEC lawsuits
(Malenko and Grundfest 2014). For example, in 2018, the SEC requested documentation of
accounting practices for EPS calculation from companies that have reported a suspiciously
unrepresentative amount of post-decimal 4’s in prior financial statements (Usvyatsky and Coleman
2019).
Firms with analyst expectations were the main sample for EPS rounding analyses. In the
following section, the procedure for analyzing EPS rounding behavior for firms near the public
float threshold for SOX 404 will be outlined.

Part 4: Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Before discussing my findings, it is important to acknowledge some concerns raised by
prior studies investigating small firms near the SOX 404 threshold. Previous studies have limited
their samples to firms that report public float at the end of the second fiscal quarter. Since I am
analyzing behavior from one quarter to the next, I adopt this practice to ensure that all firms in my
sample view their first fiscal quarter as the quarter preceding their public float evaluation. In
addition, I also eliminate financial services previously subject to ICFR disclosures (financial
services firms with standard industry classifications (SICs) from 6000 to 6799) (Iliev 2010), newly
public firms that did not have a second quarter public float evaluation (Nondorf, Singer, You
2012), and firms with ordinary losses in order to control the sample for firms that had positive
earnings as an influencer for their stock prices. I also followed existing literature that has restricted
observations to firms with public float ranging from ±20% of $75 million ($60 million to $90
million) (Nondorf, Singer, You 2012). My sample covers fiscal years from 2011 to 2013, just after
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. At that time, non-accelerated filers and smaller
reporting companies were permanently exempted from SOX 404 (Kinney and Shepardson 2011).
I retrieve EPS data from Compustat’s fundamental quarterly database. I obtain net income
before extraordinary items, extraordinary items and income from discontinued operations,
common shares used to calculate basic earnings per share, common shares used to calculate diluted
earnings per share, fiscal year, and fiscal quarter (Compustat items ibadjq, xidoq, cshprq, cshfdq,
fyearq, and fqtr, respectably). Firms’ public float, evaluation quarter, and filing status were handcollected from the SEC’s EDGAR database and joined to the Compustat dataset. Observations
with ordinary net losses, SICs between 6000 and 6799, and missing values for shares and filing
status are eliminated from the sample. Observations with total net losses are removed from

analyses of EPS including extraordinary items. In addition, there were some instances of nonaccelerated filers having a public float over $75 million and accelerated filers having a public float
below $75 million; I remove both from the sample. The post-decimal digit was collected from the
thousandths digit of ( ibadjq / cshprq ) for basic ordinary EPS, ( (ibadjq + xidoq) / cshprq ) for
basic EPS with extraordinary items, ( ibadjq / cshfdq ) for diluted ordinary EPS, and ( (ibadjq +
xidoq) / cshfdq ) for diluted EPS with extraordinary items.
My initial observations aggregate the rounding behavior of non-accelerated filers and
accelerated filers by year, and then by quarter (Figure 1) before conducting a one-tailed two
variable z test for differences in proportions. Initial results show that the proportion of nonaccelerated filers’ EPS rounding down is significantly greater at the 5% level for Q1 2011 for each
type of EPS except diluted EPS with extraordinary items. In addition, the proportion of Q1 2012
EPS rounding down for non-accelerated filers was significantly greater for both types of diluted
EPS, with ordinary diluted EPS significant at the 5% level and diluted EPS with extraordinary
items significant at the 1% level.
To compensate for the limited observations when aggregating by year and then by quarter,
I next compare rounding differences aggregating solely by quarter (Figure 2) and follow up with
a one-tailed two variable z test for differences in proportions. In this analysis, the proportion of
diluted EPS rounding down for non-accelerated filers was significantly greater in just the first
fiscal quarter at the 5% level. Since both types of diluted EPS show a significant difference in only
the first fiscal quarter, I believe these results are the most compelling evidence of targeted earnings
management.
I follow up by aggregating my observations by fiscal quarter and then by post-decimal digit
(Figures 3 and 4). My null hypothesis is that the proportion of each digit occurrence should be

approximately 10% of the total sample size for a given fiscal quarter. While there are a few
differences in post-decimal digits exhibited by different types of filers across quarters, I do not
conclude that any specific digit is responsible for the significant difference in rounding behavior
for each type of filer. Instead, it appears that the difference in rounding behavior is consistent
across most digits in the first fiscal quarter; only one digit between 0 and 4 has a smaller proportion
of non-accelerated filers exhibiting it compared to accelerated filers, and only one digit between 5
and 9 has a greater proportion of non-accelerated filers exhibiting it compared to accelerated filers.
Instead of a decreased likelihood to exhibit a specific digit, such as the phenomena referred to as
quadrophobia (Malenko and Grundfest 2014), my digit-by-digit analysis suggests that overall
rounding behavior is not being influenced by the avoidance or preference of any specific postdecimal digit.
My last analysis of the data is a difference-in-difference regression model for each type of
EPS, aggregated by quarter. My model is as follows:
ROUNDDOWN = α + β1Q1 + β2NAF + β3Q1NAF + ε
The variable ROUNDDOWN is the probability of EPS rounding down and having a post-decimal
digit range from 0-4, Q1 is 1 if the observation was from the first quarter of the fiscal year and 0
if otherwise, NAF is 1 if the firm was a non-accelerated filer at the time and 0 if an accelerated
filer, and Q1NAF is 1 if the data was from a non-accelerated filer in the first fiscal quarter and 0
for any other observation. Figure 5 outlines the coefficient values for each type of EPS. If my
hypothesis is supported by my data, I would expect to see a significant positive coefficient for
Q1NAF. As the results show, Q1NAF for ordinary diluted EPS and diluted EPS with extraordinary
items was positive and statistically significant with t-values of 1.53 and 1.77, respectively. These
results are statistically significant with a one-tailed t test at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.

These results are consistent with Malenko and Grundfest (2014) because these rounding
anomalies are most prevalent in diluted EPS including extraordinary items. Their study observed
greater rounding abnormalities in diluted EPS since outside decision makers place a greater
emphasis on it over basic EPS (Malenko and Grundfest 2014), and my finding is also consistent
with their conclusion that diluted EPS would be more susceptible to rounding abnormalities. If
these rounding abnormalities are created with the intention of inducing a psychological effect on
an investor and influencing their stock’s attractiveness in the market, it would make the most sense
that diluted EPS is the EPS type that exhibits a suggestive and statically significant coefficient for
Q1NAF.

Part 5: Discussion and Conclusion
My results from part 4 are suggestive of an overall difference between non-accelerated and
accelerated filers, but the significant coefficient of Q1NAF for diluted EPS with extraordinary
items suggests that this difference may be unique to non-accelerated filers for just the first fiscal
quarter. There are several reasons why this may be the case. Non-accelerated filers may have
greater incentives to round down diluted EPS with extraordinary items, or accelerated filers are
placed under more pressure to round up their EPS. If non-accelerated filers’ management is placed
under pressure to manage their public float leading up to a public float evaluation at the end of the
second fiscal quarter, they must choose between either influencing the quantity of shares held by
outsiders or the value of their stock. Both strategies are viable options, but slightly altering EPS
has the benefit of not impacting a firm’s financing structure in the long term. Regardless, it may
be inferred that the cost associated with managing EPS are exceeded by the potential cost of SOX
404 compliance in as early as the next fiscal year.

Since the non-accelerated filers and accelerated filers in my samples are still roughly of
equal size, using public float as a measurement of size, financial analyst coverage should be about
the same, with the exception of the additional scrutiny faced by non-accelerated filers in a public
float evaluation at the end of the second fiscal quarter. If investors are aware of the potential
redirection of shareholder wealth towards SOX 404 compliance, then more attention may be
placed on EPS in the months leading up to the evaluation, creating an opportunity for EPS rounding
to have a psychological effect on investor’s decision making. I find it especially compelling that
my findings along with Malenko and Grundfest’s both observe these significant EPS rounding
differences in diluted EPS, arguably the most significant EPS type analysts use to assess firm
performance (Malenko and Grundfest 2014).
I find it reasonable that the digit-by-digit analyses did not reveal a pervasive attractiveness
or avoidance to any particular post-decimal digit in any quarter; most of the significant differences
in the occurrence of specific digits appeared with digits that do not straddle the border between
rounding up and rounding down (digits 4 or 5). I would be less convinced of any sort of
fundamental EPS rounding differences if they manifested themselves exclusively in digits that did
not straddle the rounding border, since this may suggest nothing more than noise. Since there is an
overall lower likelihood of non-accelerated filers representing any of the digits that would cause
EPS to round down, then this observation may be more suggestive than a statistical anomaly.
I am surprised to see these results almost a decade after the issuance of SOX. Despite the
efforts by the PCAOB and Congress to make the ICFR audit of SOX 404 more manageable for
small companies, SOX 404 still seems to be a hurdle for them. Perhaps this is a natural response
for any firm placed in a position where they must choose between compliance expenses or
dedicating those resources to value-added activities. Ironically, the SOX 404 compliance threshold

between non-accelerated and accelerated filers may be the reason why these rounding
abnormalities exist, thus creating a situation where a law intended to increase transparency instead
incentivizes obfuscating information.
Additional research should be directed towards scaling SOX 404’s compliance
requirement. Public float is representative of the public’s stake in a company, and more research
should be conducted on the market effects of companies straddling the compliance threshold with
materially misstated financial statements. By determining the cost imposed when SOX 404 fails
or when it is not present, more insight can be made on whether the compliance costs to avert this
damage are worth it. The existing line between non-accelerated and accelerated filers was the
arbitrary border set for SOX 404 compliance. Now, almost 20 years later, a more defined threshold
should be set in order to protect small companies’ resources and prioritize growth potential over
compliance.

Bold t values signify coefficients significant at the 10% level with a one-tailed test. Bold t values with an asterisk represent
coefficients significant at the 5% level with a one-tailed test.
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